Adversarial Examples and Adversarial Training

Ian Goodfellow, OpenAI Research Scientist Guest lecture for CS 294-131, UC Berkeley, 2016-10-05



In this presentation

- "Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks" Szegedy et al, 2013
- "Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples"
 Goodfellow et al 2014
- "Adversarial Perturbations of Deep Neural Networks" Warde-Farley and Goodfellow, 2016





In this presentation

- "Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phenomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samples"
 Papernot et al 2016
- "Practical Black-Box Attacks against Deep Learning Systems using Adversarial Examples" Papernot et al 2016
- "Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural Networks for Malware Classification" Grosse et al 2016 (not my own work)





In this presentation

- "Distributional Smoothing with Virtual Adversarial Training" Miyato et al 2015 (not my own work)
- "Virtual Adversarial Training for Semi-Supervised Text Classification" Miyato et al 2016

• "Adversarial Examples in the Physical World" Kurakin et al 2016






Overview

- What are adversarial examples?
- Why do they happen?
- How can they be used to compromise machine learning systems?
- What are the defenses?
- How to use adversarial examples to improve machine learning, even when there is no adversary

Since 2013, deep neural networks have matched human performance at...



(Szegedy et al, 2014)

...recognizing objects and faces....



(Taigmen et al, 2013)



(Goodfellow et al, 2013)


...solving CAPTCHAS and reading addresses...



(Goodfellow et al, 2013)

and other tasks...


Adversarial Examples





Timeline:

"Adversarial Classification" Dalvi et al 2004: fool spam filter "Evasion Attacks Against Machine Learning at Test Time" Biggio 2013: fool neural nets Szegedy et al 2013: fool ImageNet classifiers imperceptibly Goodfellow et al 2014: cheap, closed form attack


Turning Objects into "Airplanes"








Attacking a Linear Model




Not just for neural nets


- Linear models
 - Logistic regression
 - Softmax regression
 - SVMs
- Decision trees
- Nearest neighbors




Adversarial Examples from Excessive Linearity




Modern deep nets are very piecewise linear



Nearly Linear Responses in Practice



Small inter-class distances



All three perturbations have L2 norm 3.96 This is actually small. We typically use 7!

The Fast Gradient Sign Method

$$J(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) \approx J(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) + (\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}} - \boldsymbol{x})^\top \nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{x}).$$


Maximize


$$J(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{\theta}) + (\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}} - \boldsymbol{x})^{\top} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{x}} J(\boldsymbol{x})$$

subject to

$$egin{aligned} & \| ilde{m{x}} - m{x}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon \ & \Rightarrow ilde{m{x}} = m{x} + \epsilon \mathrm{sign}\left(
abla_{m{x}} J(m{x})
ight). \end{aligned}$$


Maps of Adversarial and Random Cross-Sections






(collaboration with David Warde-Farley and Nicolas Papernot)

Maps of Adversarial Cross-Sections



Maps of Random Cross-Sections



Clever Hans



("Clever Hans, Clever Algorithms," Bob Sturm)



Wrong almost everywhere

High-Dimensional Linear Models

Weights




Signs of weights




Clean examples										
7	7	7	3	7	7	3	3	3	3	
3	3	7	1	З	7	7	7	3	7	
3	7	З	3	Ŧ	7	3	3	3	3	
7	7	7	7	7	3	7	7	7	3	
3	3	7	7	7	3	3			3	
3	3			ŋ	7	7	7	7	7	
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7	7	7	3	7	7	7	૩	7	3	
7	7	7	3	7	3	3	7	3	3	
7	7	3	3	17	3	7	3	3	3	

Adversarial




Linear Models of ImageNet




(Andrej Karpathy, "Breaking Linear Classifiers on ImageNet")

RBFs behave more intuitively



Cross-model, cross-dataset generalization




Cross-technique transferability

DNN	38.27	23.02	64.32	79.31	8.36	20.72 -	
Learning Technique	6.31	91.64	91.43	87.42	11.29	44.14 -	
	2.51	36.56	100.0	80.03	5.19	15.67	
Source Machine	0.82	12.22	8.85	89.29	3.31	5.11	
NNS kNN	11.75	42.89	82.16	82.95	41.65	31.92 -	
L	DNN LR SVM DT kNN Ens. Target Machine Learning Technique						

(Papernot 2016)

Transferability Attack Target model with Substitute model unknown weights, Train your mimicking target machine learning own model algorithm, training model with known, differentiable function set; maybe nondifferentiable dversarial crafting Deploy adversarial against substitute Adversarial examples against the target; transferability examples property results in them succeeding

Cross-Training Data Transferability




Strong

Weak

Intermediate

(Papernot 2016)

Adversarial Examples in the Human Brain



These are concentric circles, not intertwined spirals.

(Pinna and Gregory, 2002)

Practical Attacks

- Fool real classifiers trained by remotely hosted API (MetaMind, Amazon, Google)
- Fool malware detector networks
- Display adversarial examples in the physical world and fool machine learning systems that perceive them through a camera

Adversarial Examples in the Physical World




(a) Printout

(b) Photo of printout

(c) Cropped image

Hypothetical Attacks on Autonomous Vehicles




Failed defenses

Generative Removing perturbation pretraining with an autoencoder Adding noise at test time Ensembles Confidence-reducing Error correcting perturbation at test time codes Multiple glimpses Weight decay Double backprop Adding noise Various at train time non-linear units Dropout


Generative Modeling is not Sufficient to Solve the Problem

Both these two class mixture models implement roughly the same marginal over *x*, with very different posteriors over the classes. The likelihood criterion cannot strongly prefer one to the other, and in many cases will prefer the bad one.



Universal approximator theorem


Neural nets can represent either function:





Maximum likelihood doesn't cause them to learn the right function. But we can fix that...

Training on Adversarial Examples




Adversarial Training of other Models

- Linear models: SVM / linear regression cannot learn a step function, so adversarial training is less useful, very similar to weight decay
- k-NN: adversarial training is prone to overfitting.
- Takeway: neural nets can actually become more secure than other models. Adversarially trained neural nets have the best empirical success rate on adversarial examples of any machine learning model.

Weaknesses Persist



Adversarial Training



Virtual Adversarial Training

Unlabeled; model guesses it's probably a bird, maybe a plane New guess should match old guess (probably bird, maybe plane)




Adversarial perturbation intended to change the guess



Text Classification with VAT

RCV1 Misclassification Rate



⁽Goodfellow 2016)

Universal engineering machine (model-based optimization)

Make new inventions by finding input that maximizes model's predicted performance

Training data Extrapolation







Conclusion

- Attacking is easy
- Defending is difficult
- Benchmarking vulnerability is training
- Adversarial training provides regularization and semisupervised learning
- The out-of-domain input problem is a bottleneck for model-based optimization generally

cleverhans

Open-source library available at:

https://github.com/openai/cleverhans Built on top of TensorFlow (Theano support anticipated) Standard implementation of attacks, for adversarial training and reproducible benchmarks

